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Abstract  
Despite recent reductions, Brazil remains among the top deforesting countries in the world, 
and is thus one of the countries where ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation’ (REDD) initiatives could potentially have the most tangible returns for climate-
change mitigation. Economic incentives, such as payments for environmental services (PES) 
represent one option to induce forestland stewards under appropriate property right regimes to 
conserve more forests. Yet, for the large part of Amazon deforestation that occurs on non-
designated public lands (terra devoluta) as well as on poorly delimited private land, PES will 
not be viable in the short and medium term. REDD will thus also require other tools, notably 
improved command-and-control disincentives that enforce existing forest laws more 
rigorously. While quite a number of studies have addressed the potential costs of using PES 
as a REDD vehicle, cost estimates of control-based REDD strategies are speculative at best. 
In this study, we develop a conceptual framework and a spatially explicit model to analyse 
regulatory enforcement in the context of the Brazilian Amazon. We validate the model’s 
performance based on historical deforestation and enforcement mission data covering the 
years 2002-9. Based on an optimal enforcement scenario we analyse the costs of liability 
establishment and legal coercion for alternative REDD targets and evaluate local welfare 
impacts in terms of land users’ opportunity costs or fine obligations depending on local 
compliance.  
On the basis of the results, we discuss implications for the introduction of a planned national 
PES Program and assess alternative REDD strategies with regard to costs and welfare 
implications.  
Our findings suggest that spatial patterns deforestation and inspection costs influence 
enforcement strategies and thus welfare effects of REDD interventions. Command-and-
control is the most cost-effective REDD instrument from a regulator’s point of view, but 
could cost land users over R$ 2.5 billion annually in opportunity costs and fines if the national 
REDD target of an 80% reduction in deforestation rates was achieved. PES incentives could 
reduce the social costs, but increase budget outlays vis-à-vis a command-and-control 
dominated strategy and both legal and institutional challenges have to be overcome to make 
 5 
PES work at a larger scale. Decision-makers will thus have to innovatively combine on the 
ground implementation tools in order to make REDD both financially viable and socially 
compatible.   
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1  Introduction 
Numerous initiatives to Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD1) 
are flowering worldwide, especially in countries with traditionally high deforestation rates, 
such as Brazil and Indonesia (Cenamo et al. 2009; Cerbu et al. 2011). Project-type approaches 
still dominate most countries’ incipient REDD landscape, but REDD is generally expected to 
develop into an intergovernmental mechanism, implemented primarily through national 
policy programs (Angelsen et al. 2009). 
Broadly speaking, national decision makers can resort to three complementary means to 
induce REDD at the local level, namely, incentives, disincentives and enabling measures. 
Incentives are understood here as measures designed to encourage forest conservation, 
whereas disincentives discourage deforestation and forest degradation. Complementary 
enabling measures, such as land-tenure regularization or environmental education, can help 
individuals to use forest resources more efficiently, thus preparing the ground for incentives 
and disincentives to work effectively.  
Incentive mechanisms, such as like payments for environmental services (PES), are usually 
based on the principles of conditional cash transfer and often looked to as prime REDD on-
the-ground implementation mechanisms (Blom et al. 2010; Bond et al, 2009). Ferraro and 
Kiss (2002) consider PES to be the most direct incentive-based conservation measure, as it 
represents a quid pro quo agreement between environmental service users and providers. As a 
REDD policy instrument, PES schemes would compensate land users with sufficient control 
over their land for the costs of avoiding deforestation. Being conditional on contract 
compliance, PES schemes would be enforced by reducing or suspending payments to 
unfaithful service providers.   
Disincentive-based REDD mechanisms range from taxes, production quotas and standards to 
outright deforestation and logging bans, usually enforced through sanctions such as fines, 
expropriation or imprisonment. If bans are enforced through (de facto collected) fines, they 
 
 
1 The now widely adopted official acronym is REDD+, in including other than pure conservation measures, such as carbon stock 
enhancement. For expositional reasons, we stick to the term “REDD”. Moreover, our case study focuses primarily on 
deforestation, which is the prime source of forest-based emissions in the Brazilian Amazon.  
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come to work much like taxes, representing an additional cost to production. Tax payers, too, 
need to be monitored with regard to their economic activities and legally pursued in case of 
non-compliance. Disincentive-based policy instruments thus generally involve enforcement 
costs. Environmental policy, especially in Latin America, has long been dominated by 
disincentive-based regulatory mechanisms, e.g. full or partial bans on deforestation, which 
however have proved hard to implement effectively (Seroa da Motta et al. 1996). Below we 
refer to these policy instruments as command-and-control (C&C) mechanisms.  
For direct payments to be effective REDD policy instruments, individual or collective service 
providers must be endowed with the right to exclude others from modifying forest cover on 
land under conservation agreements (Wunder 2007). This minimal institutional precondition 
for PES generally requires spatially delimited land-tenure rights, as a means to effectively 
monitor and enforce PES contracts. However, tropical forest frontiers are often characterized 
by uncontrolled immigration waves causing spontaneous settlements with poorly regulated 
tenure (Geist and Lambin 2002). Börner et al. (2010) found that 67% of threatened forestlands 
in the Brazilian Amazon are subject to ill-defined or non-clarified tenure, thus limiting the 
short- and medium-term scope for PES as a REDD vehicle. 
At the same time, many REDD candidate countries boast far-reaching environmental 
legislation restricting forest use and deforestation through C&C policies. In the Brazilian 
Amazon, most private and public tenure categories allow land users to deforest merely up to 
20% of their forests2. Illegal deforestation is nonetheless widespread, because regulations are 
poorly enforced. According to the latest agricultural census3 in 2006 the aggregated non-forest 
land uses on private properties exceeded the 20% limit in 749 out of 760 municipalities.  
In the presence of widespread structural limitations for PES and incentive-based policies, and 
a record of grossly ineffective C&C implementation, REDD strategies that combine more 
effective “stick” enforcement with compensatory “carrots” could appear promising in Brazil, 
as elsewhere in the tropics. Indeed, the Brazilian REDD strategy presented at  the Kyoto 
Protocol’s COP15 (15th Conference of the Parties) in Copenhagen (MMA 2009) stated a clear 
commitment to achieving an 80% reduction vis-à-vis historical deforestation rates by 
 
 
2 The Brazilian Forest Code: Lei Federal nº 4.771/65. 
3 www.ibge.gov.br  
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combining existing C&C measures with a national PES initiative. Nepstad et al. (2009) have 
put the price tag of achieving this target at between R$13 and 36 billion4.  
However, little thought has so far been given as to how specifically such a policy mix of 
sticks and carrots could be designed in order to achieve cost-effectiveness and equity 
objectives. This is where we hope to make a contribution with this paper. We quantitatively 
assess the potential of C&C in achieving cost-effective and equitable forest conservation 
outcomes, and set this into the perspective of PES options. Specifically, we address the 
currently weak link between the “optimal enforcement” and the “forest resource 
management” literature (Robinson et al. 2010). We do so by developing a spatially explicit 
optimal enforcement model to assess the cost-effectiveness and equity impacts of a 
disincentive-based REDD policy scenario, and applying it using data on land use and forest 
law enforcement in the Brazilian Amazon. Based on the results, we derive the implications for 
integrating C&C sticks with PES carrots. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our conceptual framework and model 
assumptions, and Section 3 documents data sources. Analysis and results are presented in 
sections 4 (cost-effectiveness), 5 (welfare) and 6 (integrating C&C and PES). Section 7 
provides our main conclusions, while we discuss some of the limitations of our approach and 
their implications for our findings in Section 8. 
 
 
4 2009 average exchange rate: US$1 = R$2 
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2  Conceptual framework  
The forest and land user’s perspective 
Deforestation, including in Brazil, often happens because both most land users, and their 
corresponding national governments, have a clear economic rationale for harvesting precious 
timber resources and increasing their farmland by converting abundant forests (Andersen et 
al. 2002; Kaimowitz 2002). Many tropical land users may, nonetheless, have interest in forest 
conservation. Indigenous and traditional forest users could be much benefitted if REDD leads 
to improved frontier governance and enhanced C&C of deforestation by external migrants and 
entrepreneurs encroaching illegally on their land. However, we focus here on the majority of 
Amazon land users who, as a baseline, incrementally convert forests to farm- and 
pasturelands, even when this deforestation is formally illegal.  
Upon deciding whether or not to deforest, land users facing C&C policies are likely to 
balance expected profits from illegal forest conversion against the odds of receiving a fine. 
Following the classical optimal enforcement model (Becker 1968), the land user’s decision to 
deforest d depends on: 
⎩
⎨
⎧
>−
≤−
=
01
00
:0,1 Fprfor
Fprfor
d
enf
enf
      (eq.1) 
Where r is the profit obtained per hectare of forest converted to agriculture, penf is the personal 
probability of deforestation being detected and effectively sanctioned, and F is the per hectare 
fine for illegal deforestation. penf and F are controlled by environmental authorities, and will 
be critical in determining land-use decisions, but must be carefully set to represent an 
effective disincentive (Robinson et al. 2010). Depending on the available means for legal 
coercion, extremely high fines can become ineffective deterrents if offenders chose to default 
on them, or do so because they are too poor to pay. Large fines may also encourage wasteful 
avoidance behaviour and increase the scope for bribe taking in weak institutional 
environments, thus introducing excessive social costs. Also, detection probability must be 
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high enough for offenses not to be considered as de facto tolerated. In their review of the 
enforcement literature, and contrary to Becker’s proposition, Robinson et al. suggest that 
effective enforcement normally requires relatively high probabilities and low fines. This is 
contrary to Becker’s initial proposition, that optimal enforcement is best achieved by 
combining high fine levels and low enforcement probabilities, thus minimizing enforcement 
costs.   
The environmental authority’s perspective 
Environmental authorities in charge of implementing REDD through enhanced forest 
conservation on the ground, will typically be up against a powerful agricultural lobby and 
many local land users’ interest in continuously expanding the agricultural frontier.  In 
allocating REDD budgets, welfare impacts on land users and sectoral development constraints 
will thus have to be balanced against cost-effectiveness criteria. A key conceptual question 
relates to whether the opportunity costs of land users should enter the regulator’s cost-
effectiveness equation (social planner’s accounting). Here we argue that recipient countries 
under an international REDD agreement can face budgetary opportunity costs that represent 
an incentive to use REDD funds in order to free up resources from the national forest sector 
budget for investment in non-forest sectors. Looking at operational cost-effectiveness and 
land users’ welfare effects of forest conservation as two separate performance indicators thus 
appears justified.   
In the context of REDD, environmental cost-effectiveness (i.e., tons of emissions avoided per 
unit of currency invested) of a national REDD program could formally be defined as follows: 
( )
REDD
i
T
t
I
i
R
titi
REDD C
BDD
E
∑∑ −
=
      (eq.2) 
where t is a period of time horizon T, i is a spatial unit of the intervention area I, D and DR 
represent, respectively, deforestation without and with REDD intervention, and B represents 
the above-ground biomass carbon content lost per area unit in the form of CO2 during forest 
degradation or conversion to other uses. CREDD represents the operational costs of 
implementing national REDD policies. D, the baseline deforestation level, is established ex-
ante by assessing historical trends. DR, the de facto realized deforestation, is in principle 
established ex post through deforestation monitoring, but here we will model the impacts of 
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different policy instrument on D. B, the area’s carbon density, is usually determined through 
remote sensing analyses and selective field measurements of forest biomass content.  
 
Effective C&C based REDD will incur operational costs in three categories: a) liability 
establishment, b) administrative processes, and c) legal coercion.  
Liability establishment principally involves the cost of travelling to detected deforestation 
patches: more frequent inspections to more deforestation sites raises the probability of 
regulators to confront potential offenders, but also increases the costs of field presence.   
Variable administrative costs arise from legal processes that result once illegal deforestation 
has been officially confirmed. Depending on the type of offense and legal action taken by 
presumed offenders, processes can run through various instances. Administrative costs can be 
particularly high if enforcement is effective in detecting offenses, but ineffective in following 
up with sanctions. Like in the Brazilian case, such an ineffective enforcement scenario tends 
to result in high non-compliance levels and consequently high administrative costs.  
Coercive action is required if offenders choose to default on fines. The cost of effective 
coercive action depends on the available leverage mechanisms. In Brazil, a frequently 
employed and effective - though cost-intensive – measure of coercion is confiscation. A 
stylized representation of the three C&C cost elements is provided in equation 3, where the 
first term represents liability cost establishment: a cost that on average accrues in all locations 
with potential deforestation pressure. The second term includes coercion and administrative 
follow-up costs in locations, where deforestation actually occurs and liability can be 
established, as well as potential fine revenues:  
 
( ) ( ) cPFpTCDDTCpC i
I
i
enf
C
i
R
ii
L
iienfCC
+−+=∑
=1
&
    (eq.3) 
With I being the total number of spatial units i in the study area, penf is the probability of i 
being visited by an enforcement team, TC represents roundtrip costs to visit i with 
superscripts L and C identifying liability establishment and coercion (i.e. confiscation) costs, 
respectively. P is the number of deforestation polygons in i and c the administrative cost of 
following up on the environmental offense, and F represents fine revenues.  
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Representing the land user – enforcement agency relationship by way of equations 1 and 3 
rests on the assumption that the available enforcement budget is optimally allocated to cover 
operational enforcement costs, i.e. the level of effectiveness depends only on penf. In real 
world situations, multiple sources of enforcement ineffectiveness exist. For example, cross-
compliance mechanisms, such as restricted credit access for land users that default on fines, 
do exist in Brazil, but hinge on effective local institutions that are seldom in place at the forest 
margins (Brito and Barreto 2006). Some implications of representing enforcement costs by 
way of equation 3 are discussed in section 8. 
The disincentive of effective REDD-funded C&C enforcement must result in income, and 
thus, welfare losses compared to no additional action. The aggregate direct welfare effect of 
enforcement in intervention area I can be written as: 
( )( )∑ −−−=
I
i
enf
R
ii
R
iiREDD FpDrDDW
        (eq.4) 
Where the first term represents income losses (uncompensated opportunity costs) for 
compliant land users and the second term depicts fine payment costs to non-compliant land 
users. That is, forestland users that would have illegally deforested in the absence of enhanced 
C&C can choose between two strategies, according to which of them is likely to minimize 
welfare losses.  
Optimal enforcement at the forest frontier 
According to equations 3 and 4, both cost-effectiveness and welfare effects depend on how 
well the disincentive is delivered on the ground (here represented by penf, a measure of 
enforcement probability).  
To determine an optimal penf  at a given location in space, consider that regulators typically 
face a budget constraint, so that punishing every single offender is seldom an option5. If the 
costs of field presence vary in space, a common feature of extensive forest frontiers, an 
economically optimal enforcement strategy would thus prioritize nearby over remote 
 
 
5 This reflects the reality in Brazil and many other Latin-American countries. Theoretically, the prospect of fine revenues could 
eventually make enforcement a profitable undertaking.   
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deforestation polygons. Maximizing deterrence may also imply prioritizing large over small 
deforestation offenses6. The regulator’s objective function can thus be described as: 
∑∑
= =
=
I
i
P
p
ipiv svAREAi
1 1
,max        (eq.6) 
Subject to: 
1,0,
1
∈≥∑
=
i
I
i
ii vvTCBUDGET       (eq.7) 
Where AREA is the total area visit by environmental regulators, s is the size of deforestation 
polygon p in spatial unit i, and v a binary choice variable indicating whether a given polygon 
is visited by an enforcement team (v=1), or not (v=0). Maximization as a constrained linear 
programming problem7 results in a shadow value for each vi. Positive shadow values of 
constraints on v (i.e., v ≤ 1) reflect enforcement priority levels among visited i, whereas 
negative values indicate how much additional deforestation must occur in a given spatial unit 
i for an enforcement visit to become cost-effective. If polygon size and quantity are specified 
as expected values for each i, shadow values can be interpreted as economically motivated 
enforcement priorities.  
 
 
6 This also reflects that the enforcement agency’s objective is to maximize total area of inspected deforestation polygons in the 
Amazon (IBAMA personal communication, June 2009).  
7 With a high number of polygons the imprecision introduced by using a continuous constrained choice variable instead of a 
binary one is negligible. 
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Figure 1  Enforcement probabilities as a function of shadow value 
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Between 2003 and 2008, the Brazilian Environmental Protection Agency (IBAMA) had an 
average annual operational budget of approximately R$ 50 million for the Amazon region 
(IBAMA pers. comm. June 2009). In Figure 1, we apply this budget constraint to our spatially 
explicit simulation of optimal C&C enforcement in the Brazilian Amazon for a hypothetical 
year. For the simulation, polygon sizes (s) in grid cells (i) were set equal to average 2002-9 
deforestation levels.  
Applying percentile rank scores to the shadow values of the optimal solution, we obtain a 
vector of enforcement probabilities with penf below 0.5 for grid cells that were not included in 
the optimal solution of the enforcement simulation. Enforcement probabilities are somewhat 
stronger correlated with travel costs (ρTC,Penf = -0.7) than with polygon size (ρs,Penf = 0.63). 
Validation of the optimal solution by means of a municipal-level comparison with the 
location of IBAMA’s de facto enforcement missions during 2002-09 resulted in a 70% match.   
Our resulting C&C strategy is responsive rather than preemptive in nature, with field 
interventions being planned based on observed deforestation patterns. As such, it represents 
quite well the strategy currently pursued by IBAMA, with enforcement teams guided by up-
to-date satellite imagery and maps of past deforestation hotspots. 
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3  Data sources and processing 
Due to widespread Amazon deforestation, Brazil has long topped the list of tropical 
deforestation (Hansen et al. 2008). Despite considerable reductions in recent years, 
deforestation rates could pick up again once the global economy recovers from the financial 
crisis. Today, still more than three quarters of the Brazilian Amazon are covered by forests. 
Modelling scenarios, however, suggest that agricultural expansion will have reduced forest 
cover by up to 40% in 2050 (Soares-Filho et al. 2006).  
The empirical analysis in the following sections covers 4.5 million km2 of the Legal Brazilian 
Amazon, drawing on data from a variety of sources (Table 1). An area of approximately 700 
thousand square kilometres at the southwestern end of the Legal Brazilian Amazon was 
excluded due to incomplete deforestation data. The study area thus comes to represent the 
Amazon Biome rather than the formal Legal Amazon. 
Table 1  Data sources used in this study 
Data type Source 
1. Annual deforestation polygons (2002-9)  INPE-PRODES (2002-9)* 
2. Municipal-level average profits from agricultural activities and 
timber extraction (i.e. REDD opportunity costs) 
Börner et al. 2010 
3. Location and size of land-reform settlements, protected areas, and 
indigenous territories. 
IBAMA (provided in 2007) 
4. Location and size of protected areas and indigenous territories 
IBAMA, at: 
http://siscom.ibama.gov.br  
(accessed in 2009) 
5. Costs and locations (districts) of C&C enforcement operations (2003-
2008) 
IBAMA records, provided in June 
2009 
6. Population estimates (Amazon region) IBGE** Agricultural Census 2006 
* The Brazilian Space Research Centre’s (INPE) Program for the Calculation of Deforestation in the Amazon: 
www.obt.inpe.br/prodes/  
** The Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE) 
In order to estimate the travel costs of enforcement missions as a function of travel time, we 
used parameters derived from various interviews with IBAMA officials at their headquarters 
in Brasilia (September/October 2009) (Table 2).  
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Table 2  Field presence cost estimates  
 Quantity/unit R$8/unit R$ per h 
Manpower 8 3000 per month 150 
Diesel 30 liters  60 
Car rental 2 500 per day 125 
Helicopter purchase cost - - 4000 
Other cost (air travel, housing, etc.)  150 
Source: Interviews with IBAMA officials (2009)  
 
Shortest possible travel time by road and waterways was estimated from 524 Amazon 
municipal centres to the centre points of 11181 grid cells with a size of 400 km2, using the 
Accessibility Analyst software package9 developed by the International Centre for Tropical 
Agriculture (CIAT). Travel speed on waterways, unpaved and paved roads was set to 10, 25 
and 60 km/h, respectively. Figure 2 shows the results, in terms of travel time from the nearest 
urban centre to each grid cell. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 R$ 1 ~ US$ 0.58 (January 2010) 
9 http://webapp.ciat.cgiar.org/access/ 
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Figure 2  Travel time to grid cells from nearest urban center in the Brazilian Amazon 
(white areas excluded from the study area) 
 
Using the parameters in Table 4, we can estimate the parameter TC (travel costs per polygon 
visit, eq. 4), with the underlying assumption that all polygons falling in to the same grid cell 
can be visited at the same cost. Parameter r (per-ha net returns to forest conversion, eq. 1) was 
calculated as a municipal-level average using official annual production statistics from IBGE 
(for methods and analysis, see Börner et al. 2010). Ds (baseline deforestation, eq. 2) and P 
(number of deforestation polygons per grid cell, eq. 4) was estimated from official 
deforestation data (see Table 3). Finally, parameter c (administrative cost per identified 
offense, eq. 4) was estimated on the basis of an assessment of administrative efficiency by 
Micol et al. (2008). 
Spatial data processing involved overlays of deforestation with tenure data and zonal statistics 
on 100 meter resolution grids, in order to assign each deforestation polygon to a unique grid 
cell and tenure category. Tenure categories include land reform settlements (252,142 km2), 
Indigenous Territories (970,441 km2), Protected Areas (786,317 km2), not officially delimited 
tenure (2,340,727 km2), and others (52,579 km2).  Overlapping tenure categories (totalling 
67,632 km2 ~ 1.4% of the study area) were analysed separately.  
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4  Enforcement costs and REDD supply 
Assessing the operational cost and effectiveness of enforcing C&C based REDD, using the 
model set out in section 2 (equations 2 and 3), requires probability measures for deforestation 
patterns in spatial units. Using spatial deforestation data, we derive expected values for annual 
deforestation (Dsi) and average deforestation polygon number (Pi) in each of the 11,181 grid 
cells in which deforestation occurred during 2002-9. As a result, we applied the model to an 
average annual baseline deforestation level of 17,462 km2, i.e. slightly lower than the 19,500 
km2 reference scenario of the Brazilian REDD strategy that is based on the period 1996-2005. 
Land users’ opportunity costs are estimated over a 10-year planning horizon (Börner et al. 
2010) and policy implementation costs and welfare effects must be interpreted as arising from 
the provision of a C&C disincentive over the same planning horizon.   
Figure 3 depicts the operational costs and compliance effectiveness of four different C&C 
implementation scenarios: with and without fine revenues, and with and without fully 
clarified land use rights in the undelimited tenure category (see section 3). For each scenario, 
we look at operational costs over the full range of avoided deforestation targets, in the sense 
that C&C targets are enforced by increasing the level of per-hectare fines. The first scenario 
(clarified rights) assumes that field inspections by enforcement teams directly translates into 
corresponding enforcement probabilities, i.e. if an enforcement team visits a given grid cell 
once in ten years, then land users face a one in ten chance to be effectively fined. In the 
second scenario (status quo rights), we assume, more realistically, that field inspections will 
only be half as effective in areas with poorly defined tenure status (52.3 % of the study area) 
or where deforestation occurs in publicly owned strictly protected areas (7.3%), because in 
those cases it will typically be much more difficult to link deforestation to liable land users. 
During 2002-9, 68.6% of total forest loss was detected in areas with poorly delimited tenure, 
compared to only 1.1% in strictly protected areas.  
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Figure 3  Operational costs, potential net revenue and effectiveness of enforcing 
Brazilian forest laws, as percentage of avoided deforestation 
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Under the clarified rights scenario (grey lines), operational costs are slightly lower than under 
the status quo rights (black line) scenario, because a higher number of non-compliant land 
users require higher outlays for administrative and coercive action when tenure is unclear. At 
80% avoided deforestation, the operational cost difference is R$ 372 versus R$ 392 million, 
i.e. roughly R$20 million. Hence, current efforts by the Brazilian government to increasingly 
clarify Amazon land tenure could also make C&C implementation more cost-effective, so that 
future scenarios come to lie somewhere between the status quo and clarified rights 
simulations.    
If fines can effectively be collected (dotted-line scenarios), C&C could result in negative costs 
(i.e. net revenues for regulators) as soon as avoided deforestation reaches 5-10%. Well-
defined tenure conditions could boost net revenues of regulatory enforcement by R$43 
million at the 80% avoided deforestation target. The sharp initial decline in net enforcement 
costs is explained through a boost in fine revenues as per-hectare fines increase, while still 
affecting a large group of non-compliant land users with low opportunity cost. As compliance 
increases, fine revenues level off, but enforcement costs also go down, due to increasing 
compliance levels. In the perfect tenure scenario, a 20% reduction in deforestation rates could 
be achieved by setting per-hectare fines at R$1370, whereas the 80% effectiveness target 
  24 
requires a R$3104 fine per hectare of illegally cleared forest. In the more realistic status quo 
rights scenario, fine levels must increase to R$2093 and R$5509 to achieve 20% or 80% 
conservation effectiveness, respectively. Thus, it is notable that, under perfect conditions, 
improved deforestation C&C could more than pay for itself through fine collection. However, 
for a variety of reasons (see below), environmental authorities in Brazil have collected only 
0.6% of environmental fines applied during 2005-910. Hence, a realistic implementation 
scenario will probably come to be closer to the fully drawn than to the dotted lines.       
If regulators were interested in maintaining lower fine levels (e.g. out of a recognition that 
high fines are less likely to be paid, Section 2), 80% effectiveness could alternatively be 
achieved by increasing field presence to compensate for the lower penalties. Under perfect 
enforcement, i.e. successfully penalizing every single offense, our model suggests that the 
minimum per-hectare fine level must lie at R$2450, less than half the fine level of imperfect 
enforcement. Perfect enforcement of the 80% effectiveness target would cost regulators 
R$656 million annually, but potentially still come with R$839 million in fine revenues. This 
represents, nonetheless, a 40% loss in cost-effectiveness, compared to imperfect enforcement.  
Figure 4 shows for the 80% reduced deforestation and status quo rights scenario the spatial 
distribution of total operational C&C costs, potential fine revenues, and the net budgetary 
outcome of subtracting the two. While fine revenues do compensate for operational costs at 
the aggregate level, operational costs are simulated to be higher than fine revenues in over 
84% of the grid cells where deforestation was detected during 2002-9. Clusters of grid cells 
with very high operational enforcement costs and fine revenues are located primarily in the 
states of Pará and Rondônia and, to some extent, in Roraima. Enforcement costs are especially 
high in grid cells with a large number of scattered deforestation polygons, rather than few 
large ones.  
Fine revenues accrue only where the C&C disincentive is not high enough to induce 
compliance. High fine revenues thus occur in grid cells that combine high opportunity costs 
with large deforested areas and relatively few deforestation patches. Since such locations are 
also prioritized by an economically optimal enforcement strategy (see Section 2), little room 
exists to further increase compliance here through higher field presence. Even under perfect 
 
 
10 Tribunal de Contas da União 2009 (accessed in June 2010): www.tcu.gov.br/contasdegoverno   
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enforcement, landowners are best served here to just pay their fines, as if it was a tax. Higher 
fines or equivalently deterrent cross-compliance mechanisms would then be needed to further 
reduce deforestation by C&C alone (see discussion in Section 6).  
 
Figure 4  Operational enforcement costs, potential fine revenues and net budgetary 
gains (green areas) versus costs (red areas) of an 80% reduction in 2002-9 annual 
average deforestation in a scenario with status quo tenure conditions 
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5  Welfare and equity implications of enforcing REDD 
In the absence of compensation mechanisms, more rigid enforcement of conservation 
regulations results in two types of welfare effects: non-compliant land users pay fines, 
whereas compliant land users suffer opportunity costs (Section 2). Table 3 separates these 
effects for the two alternative tenure scenarios, and for high versus low conservation target.  
Table 3  Land user annual welfare losses from enforcing forest conservation targets in 
the Brazilian Amazon  
Scenario Total loss 
Million R$ 
Losses through fines 
% 
Opportunity costs 
% 
80% conservation with 
status quo use rights 
2,850 24 76 
80% conservation with 
clarified use rights 
2,852 25 75 
20 % conservation with 
status quo use rights 
1,585 77 23 
20% conservation with 
clarified use rights 
1,829 
 
83 17 
  
At an elevated 80% conservation target, simulated welfare changes vis-à-vis current levels of 
predominantly illegal deforestation are clearly dominated by higher opportunity costs, which 
account for three quarters of net changes. Total welfare loss is estimated at R$2,580 annually 
under status quo largely unclear use right conditions -- slightly higher so under the clarified 
rights scenario, because fines are collected more effectively from non-compliant land users. 
According to official IBGE estimates this total welfare loss represents 69% of the average 
annual growth in value added from agriculture, forestry, and fisheries in Amazon states (or 
20% of the national value added in these sectors) for the period 2002-8.  
Since tenure regulation would increase the effectiveness of enforcement missions in areas that 
account for the major share of forest loss, fines could then be set at lower levels. With lower 
fines, offenses in high opportunity cost areas become profitable, whereas more effective 
enforcement in low opportunity cost areas with clarified tenure conditions increases 
compliance levels. The latter effect is slightly stronger, which is why opportunity cost related 
welfare losses reduce by one percentage point (about R$22 million in absolute terms) under 
the clarified use rights scenario.  
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The patterns of welfare changes in the lower 20% conservation scenario are similar, but the 
increase in total welfare loss when moving from the status quo to the clarified tenure scenario 
is much more pronounced (R$245 million as opposed to R$2 million). The reason is that 
tenure regulation enables fine collection from much larger number of non-compliant land 
users. In fact, fine payments dominate welfare losses at the low conservation target by and 
83% in the perfect and (77%) in the status quo tenure simulations, respectively, due to the 
larger number of fine paying non-compliant land users.  
A comparison of welfare outcomes in the 20% versus 80% conservation scenario reveals that 
the first 20% of deforestation reduction cause a greater absolute welfare loss than moving the 
conservation target all the way up to 80%. This is the result of an optimal enforcement 
strategy that prioritizes nearby and large-scale offenses, which typically exhibit higher 
opportunity costs. A perfectly reasonable enforcement strategy thus comes to produce an 
economically inefficient outcome at the national level, because 20% conservation could have 
been achieved at a much smaller economic loss if low opportunity cost areas had been 
prioritized (for a discussion of implications for the optimal mix of REDD policy tools, see 
Section 6).  
To assess equity outcomes, we have to look at the distribution of welfare losses. C&C 
induced costs reflect the distribution of deforestation pressures across tenure categories. For 
example, the simulated improvement in use right regulation would affect an area of 
approximately 2.3 million km2 that comprises almost 55% of all deforestation patches 
detected between 2002-9 and caused predominantly by private (often large) landholders and 
occupants of public land. Under the 80% conservation target, roughly 68% of the total annual 
welfare loss accrues to land users that live in these areas with poorly regulated tenure 
conditions. Despite lower fine levels, absolute welfare loss for this tenure category increases 
by almost R$42 million in the regulated tenure scenario, whereas it reduces by roughly the 
equivalent amount in all other tenure category. Put differently, if the enforcement 
effectiveness loss due to unregulated tenure is compensated by higher fine levels, land users 
in well-established tenure categories have to face otherwise unnecessary high fine revenues. 
The second largest absolute welfare loss in the 80% conservation scenario (19%) accrues to 
land reform settlements that comprise almost a quarter of all deforestation patches detected in 
the eight-year period. Tenure regulation in combination with lower fixed per-hectare fines 
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could reduce this burden by R$20 million annually, while maintaining the 80% conservation 
target. Protected areas that allow sustainable use account for 6% of the total welfare loss, 
whereas indigenous territories and strictly protected areas would face a 3 and 1% share, 
respectively.      
Figure 5 depicts the spatial distribution of welfare changes for the status quo tenure scenario 
of 80% conservation. In absolute terms, high welfare losses seem to occur above all in states 
with active deforestation frontiers, such as Pará, Mato Grosso and Rondônia and, to some 
extent, in the extreme northern Amazon at the well-connected border to Venezuela. The 
picture slightly changes, however, if average welfare loss per offense is considered – an 
indicator of individual welfare loss (not shown in Figure 5). In terms of individual welfare 
loss, Mato Grosso stands out as the state with the largest number of high negative value grid 
cells. The reason is that deforestation in Mato Grosso is generally larger scale than in most 
other states, hence, absolute welfare effects are distributed over a smaller number of 
deforestation polygons. While the state of Pará boasts 346 grid cells with absolute welfare 
losses above the third quartile value, the number of high value grid cells is 42% lower for 
average welfare loss. The inverse is true for Mato Grosso, where the number of grid cells with 
third quartile level average welfare loss is 37% higher than that of absolute welfare loss cells.  
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Figure 5  Absolute welfare change as a result of inducing an 80% deforestation target 
through C&C measures under status quo right conditions 
 
As expected, the welfare effects of C&C induced forest conservation are thus rather unequally 
distributed over space, tenure categories, and individual land users. Land users that have 
engaged little in deforestation in the past, such as indigenous and traditional populations, 
would face relatively small or no welfare loss through enhanced C&C enforcement, whereas 
as opposed to settlers, private landholders, and occupants. Changes in the enforcement 
strategy do not seem to substantially alter distributional effects. For example, if each and 
every offense was inspected and sanctioned (perfect enforcement), the Gini coefficient of 
average (per offense) welfare effects would only fall slightly from 0.48 to 0.4611.     
 
 
11 Since welfare effects are negative, larger Gini coefficients indicate higher concentration of losses in fewer grid cells.   
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6  Integrating REDD sticks and carrots 
The analyses in sections 4 and 5 suggest that budgetary constraints probably play a minor role 
in preventing a policy shift towards more effective enforcement of existing environmental 
legislation in the Brazilian Amazon: increased enforcement could widely pay for itself, 
provided that fine collection becomes effective. However, an ambitious 80% reduction in 
deforestation will cause agribusiness and smallholders to lose out significantly, so that these 
groups would become key political economy barriers to REDD. Strong local political 
reactions against a 2008 IBAMA crackdown on illegal logging, and national-level 
parliamentary strength of the agribusiness lobby foreshadow that REDD is bound to 
encounter formidable political resistance. Using PES carrots has thus been suggested as a way 
to appease the losers, and thus devise a politically more viable complementary strategy for 
REDD on-the-ground implementation. In this section, we discuss three conditioning factors 
for the implementation of PES in the Brazilian Amazon. 
Pre-existing environmental legislation and forest tenure 
In Brazil, REDD is facing an environmental policy context where little deforestation can 
occur legally. As mentioned, the Brazilian Forest Code requires the majority of Amazon 
properties under private tenure to keep an 80% forest cover. The remaining public tenure 
categories typically restrict land use even further. However, since the enforcement of 
conservation laws has been lax over many years, illegal deforestation has been widely 
tolerated, and land users have come to consider tolerated deforestation an entitlement (May 
and Millikan, 2010). Hence, while REDD could de facto reduce emissions substantially, only 
a small share would be de jure additional,  
A discrepancy between de jure and de facto additionality is a common feature among REDD 
candidate countries in Latin America (Armas et al. 2009). Hence, designing an international 
compensation mechanism requires carefully balancing the odds of discouraging national 
efforts through environmental budget substitution against the risk of losing out on substantial 
mitigation opportunities.  For the Brazilian case, our welfare analysis above supports the 
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notion that a politically viable national REDD approach may require budgets for 
compensatory measures. Given legal constraints, PES would essentially take the form of a 
compliance subsidy, rather than a full-blown compensation of conservation opportunity costs.   
As mentioned, most threatened Amazon forests are not held under clear property rights. This 
would currently restrict the scope for offering conditional landowner compensations to little 
more than a third of threatened forests (Börner et al. 2010).  Nevertheless, the federal Terra 
Legal12 program and several state-level land survey initiatives are underway, which will 
elevate this scope in years to come. 
Enforcement costs of PES contracts 
In the literature, conservation opportunity costs are often used to roughly estimate required 
compensation amounts (Börner et al. 2010, Nepstad et al. 2009, Grieg-Gran 2006). Empirical 
assessments of PES schemes suggest that opportunity costs indeed represent the major share 
of total implementation costs, but transaction costs could still be significant (Wunder et al. 
2008). Implications for PES-based REDD arise from our analysis of C&C with regard to 
contract enforcement.  
Different from C&C rules, PES contracts can potentially be leveraged through the suspension 
of payments, but compliance still requires effective enforcement. To illustrate this, consider 
the following variant of equation 1 (Section 2):  
⎩
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enf      (eq.8) 
where PES depicts a conditional per-hectare compensation. Unless enforcement is perfect (penf  
= 1), a PES incentive that equals the land user’s opportunity cost will be insufficient to avoid 
deforestation. Moreover, it pays off to receive PES without complying, when detection is only 
penalized with termination of payments. Imperfect PES enforcement thus provides an 
 
 
12 The Terra Legal Program is a pragmatic attempt to regulate occupied public lands that had covered over 10 million hectares of 
land until the end of 2010: http://portal.mda.gov.br/terralegal/    
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economic incentive to pocket payments and continue business-as-usual – a potentially high 
loss in the overall cost-effectiveness of a national REDD scheme.13 
The costs of enforcing PES contracts will depend on the rules regarding liability attribution 
and contract coercion. Like in the Mexican national PES program, contracts could potentially 
hold landowners liable for any loss in service provision, i.e., suspending payments even for 
externally caused damages such as third-party invasion or fires spreading from neighbouring 
plots (Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008). Nonetheless, landowners would tend to factor in these risks 
and only accept PES contracts with higher per-hectare payments. If fixed per-hectare 
payments had to be increased by 10% in the Brazilian Amazon, our spatial analysis suggests 
that payment costs could rise by R$687 million annually.  
Alternatively, if the liability for externally induced service losses, plus the burden of proof, 
would lie with the environmental authority, this would involve widespread field inspections 
for liability establishment, similar to C&C. Based on historical Amazon deforestation 
patterns, the incremental cost would lie around R$300 million. Correspondingly, if payments 
represent only partial subsidies for the costs of complying with underlying regulations, and/or 
sanctions include the restitution of past payments, more field presence and administrative 
effort would be needed to avoid cheating, thus triggering additional costs. Hence, making PES 
a compliance subsidy also compromises some of its attractive simplicity.    
Entitlement to PES and distributional fairness 
Apart from the implications of pre-existing regulations for the additionality of PES (see 
discussion above), the history of land grabbing and unequal access to natural resources in the 
Brazilian Amazon somewhat blurs the otherwise straightforward rationale for compensation 
payments. Compensation typically presumes entitlement, but past deforestation has not only 
been largely illegal, it has also partially taken place under illegitimate land claims. The 
perspective of compensation payments to farmers with active deforestation records, thus 
understandably raises a perception of entitlement among allegedly good forest stewards, such 
as indigenous and traditional population groups.  
 
 
13 Even elevating the risk to payback of the previously received PES amounts is generally not efficient to discourage cheating: at 
worst, the non-compliant land user has to return an ‘interest-free loan’. The only way to deter cheating would be to threaten 
with penalties that exceed PES amounts, in which case PES would become more similar to C&C. 
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Against this backdrop it would appear politically contentious to introduce PES merely 
according to de facto additionality criteria. Just like welfare losses under improved regulatory 
enforcement, payments based on a historical reference scenario would then reflect the 
underlying distribution of assets and deforestation pressure in favour of large-scale producers 
(Börner et al. 2010). Any single stick or carrot approach to REDD in the Brazilian Amazon 
would thus ignore historically motivated perceptions of fairness.  
Applying PES as a compliance subsidy, as suggested above, could reduce excessive welfare 
losses for compliant land users, but fail to be inclusive of good past forest stewards. Yet, 
designing an effective Brazilian REDD strategy will also require provisions for leakage into 
still relatively well-preserved indigenous lands and extractive reserves. Dwellers in these 
public land categories may not qualify for compensation based on their historical 
deforestation record. Our assessment of enforcement costs, nevertheless, suggests that 
actively involving local people in the protection and management of protected areas may 
justify conditional payments also on the grounds of conservation efficiency.   
7  Conclusions 
Quantitative research on the potential costs and welfare implications of REDD has so far 
focused primarily on incentive-based on-the-ground implementation tools, such as PES. Yet, 
many REDD candidate countries, most notably Brazil, will have to also rely heavily on C&C 
based disincentives, including because the bulk of historical deforestation was illegal but 
tolerated, and often a result of land grabbing. In this paper, we presented a simple conceptual 
framework for the spatial analysis of the costs and welfare implications of C&C based REDD, 
and applied it to the Brazilian Amazon.  
Our findings suggest that C&C measures in isolation constitute the most cost-effective REDD 
instrument, from an environmental regulator’s point of view. We estimate that an enforcement 
strategy to achieve the 80% reduction in forest loss stipulated by the Brazilian REDD strategy 
could cost regulators approximately R$392 million in concurrent annual operational expenses 
for field presence and administrative follow-up. This cost estimate represents little more than 
half of the maximum potential fine revenue that could result from this scenario, provided 
these fines can be collected. Realizing this potential fine revenue, however, requires 
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significant improvements in administrative efficiency and more effective legal mechanisms 
for coercive action (Brito and Barreto 2006). Moreover, both enforcement costs and fine 
revenues are sensitive to the degree of tenure regularization: improvements in the delimitation 
of land claims could potentially boost overall cost-effectiveness by up to 14%.  
The cost-effectiveness of C&C enforcement, nonetheless, differs in space. We find that 
potential fine revenues exceed enforcement costs only in 16% of the study region. At 
disaggregated spatial scales, enforcement costs tend to be higher than fines wherever 
deforestation patches are small and scattered, which applies, in particular, to states with 
comparatively low population densities like Amazonas, Acre and Amapá. Given that the 
current institutional set up requires states to complement federal environmental law 
enforcement, an optimal distribution of fine revenues probably involves disproportionally 
high transfers to states with low deforestation pressure.  
A purely C&C based Brazilian REDD strategy to achieve an 80% reduction in forest loss 
would cost land users over R$2.5 billion annually in foregone opportunity costs and paid 
fines. This represents more than two thirds of the growth in annual agricultural value added of 
the Amazon states. Though the lion’s share of economic loss would accrue to large-scale 
producers, losses to smallholders, especially in agricultural reform settlements, could be 
substantial. Not surprisingly, a “desire of the public not to enforce the law” has been 
identified in the early enforcement literature as a key obstacle to optimal enforcement (Stigler 
1970, p. 534). Indeed, outright enforcement of the 80% REDD target could have severe 
consequences for the development of regions and sectors that currently depend heavily on a 
continuous expansion of the agricultural frontier. PES incentives, in turn, could significantly 
reduce the net economic losses for land users, but would increase budget outlays vis-à-vis a 
C&C dominated strategy.  
Further implications arise for the design of the national PES program currently underway in 
Brazil. Even if an international REDD mechanism provided ample resources for direct 
conservation payments may remain partially ineffective unless PES contract enforcement was 
substantially improved vis-à-vis the status quo of C&C enforcement. The reason is that the 
loss of payments as a sanction of non-compliance becomes uncertain under imperfect 
enforcement. PES recipients facing a low enforcement probability may thus prefer to continue 
forest conversion and receive PES as an additional rent. Small to medium-scale offenders in 
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remote locations would appear particularly prone to cause this form of loss in cost-
effectiveness, which is specific to incentive-based conservation approaches and potentially 
significant in the context of REDD.  
The prospect of REDD also raises equity issues in a country, where unequal access to land is 
only gradually being tackled by an agricultural land reform and the designation of public land 
as indigenous territories or extractive reserves for traditional populations. Combining existing 
C&C sticks with PES carrots could increase the political scope for REDD as it could 
straighten out otherwise widely unacceptable and unequally distributed welfare gains or losses 
of applying any of the two instruments individually. While forest populations without 
deforestation record would miss out on PES if payments where distributed according to a 
historical reference scenario, leakage provision represents a key argument to compensate 
indigenous and traditional populations for co-management efforts.   
Institutional barriers to combining C&C with PES on larger scales, however, persist in the 
form of unclear or poorly delimited tenure conditions on the majority of threatened forest land 
(Börner et al. 2010). Payment schemes may therefore initially remain confined to relatively 
well-defined tenure categories, such as agricultural reform settlements (Ezzine-de-Blas et al. 
2011). Moreover, pre-existing regulatory policies render deforestation illegal in large parts of 
the Amazon, where conditional compensations could possibly be applied only to subsidize 
compliance costs. 
Hence, an optimal REDD policy mix for the Brazilian Amazon requires balancing at least two 
performance measures, cost-effectiveness and distributional equity. Stick policies require 
lower budget outlays and are thus more cost-effective than compensatory carrots, yet none of 
the two policy instruments alone addresses distributional equity. Only a combination of sticks 
and carrots, though not necessarily welfare neutral at the local level, could possibly be 
perceived as a politically viable REDD approach by a majority of stakeholders. Accelerating 
the process of land tenure delimitation and regularization as well as removing administrative 
obstacles to effective enforcement in order to make conditional compensations work at larger 
scales thus represent prime REDDiness conditions.   
Alternative forms to compensate land users for higher enforcement levels, such as subsidized 
credit lines, certification, as well as technology development and dissemination are often 
proposed as means to promote sustainable development and thus reduce deforestation through 
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enablement. These may still play a role, but can backfire by inducing further forest loss unless 
they are conditional on avoided deforestation (Angelsen and Kaimowitz 2001). Most PES 
alternative are therefore equally demanding in terms of tenure clarity and enforcement, but 
also face additional obstacles, such as adoption barriers (technological alternatives), demand 
constraints (certification), or limited leverage in case of non-compliance (credit). While 
sustainable development in the Amazon may require a much broader set of policy tools, 
complementing C&C sticks with REDD funded PES carrots could provide the necessary 
underlying incentive structure.   
8  Discussion 
A number of caveats to our enforcement model and its underlying assumptions merit further 
discussion. First, our assumed linear relationship between fines and enforcement probabilities 
may produce misleading results, especially for very high fine levels (Section 2; Robinson et 
al. 2010). We experiment with very high fine levels only in the sensitivity analyses (e.g., in 
Figure 3), so seemingly our key findings with regard to enforcement effectiveness would be 
robust if this assumption was relaxed.  
Second, the nature of the enforcement-compliance game may change over multi-period 
iterations (Heyes 2000). Compliance is the time-bound result of interactions and learning 
between land users and environmental authorities. For example, recent inspections may have 
higher deterring effects than time-distant ones. We abstract from this by assuming a quasi-
equilibrium state, in which enforcement-compliance learning rounds would already have 
taken place, so that the frequency of enforcement visits can be directly translated into 
enforcement probability as perceived by land users. Building up effective enforcement could 
take several years, and require more investments than the ones considered here, e.g. in 
building an effective local and national level institutional infrastructure for C&C enforcement. 
Hence, we here somewhat underestimate total C&C investment needs.  
Over multiple interaction periods, in addition, land users could learn about the regulators 
revealed priorities for preferably inspecting large and non-remote deforestation polygons. In 
response, agents could incrementally target smaller-sized and remote areas, to lower detection 
probabilities. IBAMA has seen incipient evidence that this may already be happening (pers. 
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comm. Nov. 2010). Counter-acting this adaptive behaviour of offenders, the authorities would 
need to inspect more areas, which would add costs and reduce C&C effectiveness.          
Fourth, our approach also assumes that compliance is a binary ‘yes or no’ decision at the 
20x20 km grid-cell level (see equation 1), whereas compliance decisions are continuous in 
reality. Our model may consequently underestimate non-compliance or overestimate non-
compliance especially where opportunity costs within grid cells are highly heterogeneous. 
While increasing the model’s resolution could alleviate the problem, only a full specification 
of land users’ net profits in each grid cell would eliminate it.   
Fifth, in the absence of adequate empirical observations our analysis ignores that deforestation 
in the Brazilian Amazon is the outcome of a pre-existing C&C disincentive. Though allegedly 
small due to chronically ineffective enforcement, a pre-existing disincentive would reduce 
returns to forest conversion compared to our estimates of opportunity costs. Our approach 
may thus slightly underestimate the cost-effectiveness of additional C&C action.  
Finally, it is worth restating that fines are used in our model merely as a currency for the size 
of the penalty required to induce compliance. However, fines are effective deterrents only 
when offenders can successfully be pursued to pay them. In the Brazilian Amazon, 
enforcement agents thus increasingly resort to in-situ confiscation of produce and equipment 
whenever illegality is obvious. But, confiscation and any other field-based legal follow-up 
results in additional enforcement costs. A key implication here is that actual fine revenues of 
improved enforcement in the region may be much lower than our estimate of maximum 
potential fine revenue. While lower fine revenues would not invalidate our findings regarding 
operational C&C costs, welfare impacts, and integration with PES, regulatory enforcement 
may ultimately represent a significant cost factor in the national budget.  
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